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A. fntroduction
Since the 1970s,,{,merica has
experienced an explosion of litigation
involving damage from pollution.
The enactment of federal legislation
such as CERCL,\, the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability,\ct of 19802
and state counterparts to such federal
acts has resulted in civil actions by
federal and state authorities seeking
to cleán up waste contaminated sites
across the nation. Defendants are
those who generate, tTansport, of
dispose of the v/astes as well as those
who own or operate the sites that
contain the wastes. In addition,
private civil lawsuits for bodily injury
and property damage have grown
exponentiaþ as lawyers have mastered
the science necessary to prove the
causal connection berween environ-
mental pollution and the damages it
inflicts on people and their property.
It is estimated that the cost of
remedying hazardous waste condi-
tions at the sites in the United States
alone will be at least 9500 bi1lion.3
Hence, the overarching social eco-
nomic question in issues of pollution
insutance is whether manufacturers
or the insurance industry will pay the
bill. For its part, the insurance indus-
try has been overwhelmed by the
number and magnitude of pollution
claims that have developed and has
sought to extricate itself from cover-
ing the risks of pollution åamage.
The property / casualty insurance
industry has used a fattly uniform set
of policy forms during the last half
century, and issues involving pollu-
tion coverage arising under those
fotms have been litigated in coastal
manufacturing states like New Jersey
and California. Slowly, non-manufac-
turing states like Montana have devel-
oped their own case law interpreting
the policy grants of coverage and
exclusions to ansv/er the critical ques-
tions about coverage for pollution.
Montana state and federal courts
have now produced enough decisions
to merit review to determine where
claimants and insurance consumers
stand in securing insurance coverage
of claims for pollution damage.
The scope of this article wìll be
limited to teview of those Montana
State and federa-l decisions involving
insurance for pollution. For a
broader consideration of the issues
raised here, see Joshua Rosenkranz's
article, The Pollation Exclu¡ton Claase
Throagh the l-noking Glass.a For the
seminal Montana perspective, see
Mark \üTilliams's 1993 article, Insurance
Couerage of Enuironmental Ltabili\ in
Montana.5
B. History of the CGL coverage
provisions
Issues of insurance for pollution
can only be discussed in context of
the pertinent policy language. Re-
view of the policy language is made
easier by the fact that the insurance
industry dudng the past {ìfty or sixty
years was using roughly the same
forms drafted by the properry/casu-
algr trade orgatizauons. Review of
these past poJicy changes is also im-
portant, because so many pollution
claims involve activities that have
been conducted by commercial enter-
prises for decades. In Montana, for
example, pollution litigation has in-
volved mining sites (including the
latgest superfund site in the wodd),
gas stations, tank truck terminals,
pole yards, rail yards and other sites
many of which have polluted for
decades and, in some cases, for more
than 100 years. Discovery of pollu-
tion damage often triggers policies
dating back to \X/odd \Øar IL
For purposes of our review, we
can break the policy drafts down into
four t¡¡pes over four periods:
(1) "accident" based policies before
1966; (2) "occurrence" based policies
post 1966; (3) poJicies containing the
" standard" pollution exclusion from
1970 until 1986; and (4) policies
contaiûing an.absolute pollution
exclusion from 1986 to date. In the
discussion that follows, we will relate
back to these policies and periods.
1. The Prc-1966 "accident" policies
Before 1.966, CGL policies, in their
grant of coverage, covered an
"accidenl' which was generally
undefined. For the insurers, in the
context of pollution, accident
meânt a sudden discharge referal>Ie
to a fixed time and did n<¡t cover
gradual pollution.6 However, the
courts fashioned different defìni-
tions of accident generally fìnding
that an event or series of events
was an accident if unexpected and
unintended.T Also, they deemed the
ultimate loss an accident even if
the polluter intended the disposal
of the waste, so long as the
ultimate loss was not intended.s
Common issues under the pre-
1966 policies were whether there
was an accident and whether the
damage was expected or intended.
Courts simply consttued the
pre-1966 policies to cover gradual
pollution. Recovery under the
pre-1.966 policies is relativeþ easy,
but their Limits ate often so low as
to be insignificant in the face of
:
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the enormous damages in many
pollution cases today.
2. The 1966 change to
ttoccuf rencett policies
In response to the uncertainry
caused by a diverse array of
common law interpretations of the
accident-based poJicies, the
insurance industry made a univer-
sal change to occurrence-based
poäcies in 1,966. Those policies
defined an "occufrence" às "an
accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions,
which results, dudng the policy
period, in bodily injury or property
damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of
the insured."e By definition, an
occurrence would include gradual
pollution so long as it was neither
expected nor intended by the
insured. As might be expected,
litigation over application of the
new occurrence-based policies to
pollution focused on the construc-
tion of the "neither expected not
intended" langnge.
In adopting the occurrence-based
coverage, the insutance industry
wanted to avoid covering industrial
clients who knowingly polluted the
environment.lo However, with the
"suddefì" requirement gone, the
courts began to find all pollution
related damage covered, even that
resulting from intentional dump-
ing, so long as the ultimate loss
was neither expected nor in-
tended.11 During this period, "the
well-pubJicized environmental
disasters of Times Beach, Love
CanøJ, and Torrey Canyon"lz
caused insurers to see the writing
on the wall for pollution coverage.
3. The (rstandard" pollution
exclusion of 1970 and its
excePtion
ln 1.970, the industry introduced
an endorsement to the standard
form CGL policy that contained
the frst pollution exclusion. Its
pertinent provisions were as
follows:
[!]his policy shall not apply
to bodily injury or property
damage adsing out of the
discharge, dispersal, release
or escape of smoke, vapors,
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
toxic chemicaJs, Jiquids or
gases, waste materials or
other irritants, contaminants
or pollutants into or upon
land, the atmosphere or àny
watefcourse or body of
water; but this exclusion does
not apply if such discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is
sudden and accidental."l3
In 1973, the ISO incorporated
what came to be known as the
"standard" pollution exclusion
direcdy into its policies as exclu-
sion (f). This provision excluded
all pollution but contained an
exception for "sudden and
accidental" discharges. As Judge
Hatfìeld said in Enron Oil Trading
dz Transporr u. UndenzriÍers of
L@d's of l-.ondon, (1996),ia the
ptactical purpose of the pollution
exclusions "is to avoid the yawning
extent of potential liability arising
from the gradual or repeated
discharge of hazardous substances
into the environment."
The explosive growth of environ-
mental tort claims, the magnitude
of the losses, and the desperation
of defendant companies to secure
coverage made inevitable intense
litigation of whether discharges
were sudden and accidental. Some
courts found the wotd "sudden"
ambþous and deemed it to mean
"unexpected" often fìrdirg in favor
of the insured manufacturers.
Others found it unambþous and
held that ithad a temporal aspect
meaning that the event had to be
abrupt or quick therefore {ìnding
in favor of the insurers. InSurers
found themselves embroiled in one
of "the most hotly ìitigated
insurance coverage questions of
the 1980s."1s
4. The 1986 "absolute" pollution
exclusion
By 1985, what is now known as
the "absolute pollution exclusion"
began to appear in the policies. It
is now widely used and was
intended to block any kind of
pollution coverage. It ptovides in
pettinent part as follows:
This insurance does not
apply to:
*t<x
f.(1) "Bodily injury" ot
"property damage" arising
out of actaal, alleged or
threatened discharge, dis-
persal, release or escape of
pollutants:16
"Pollutants" are defined as "any
soJid, liquid, gaseous or thermal
uritant or contaminant, including
smoke, -vapor, soot, fumes, acids,
alkalis, chemicals and waste. \Øaste
includes materials to be recycled,
reconditioned or reclaimed."l7
The absolute pollution e*cirrsion
removed the exception for "sudden
and accidental" releases and no
longer required that the discharge
be "into or upon land, the atmo-
sphere or any watelcoufse ot body
of water" to be excluded pollution.
It was intended to be unambþous
and broad in its exclusion of any
pollution coverage. As will be
seen, that breadth would lead to
mischief and litigation as to its
application.
C. The Montana decisions on
issues of insurance for pollution
liability
\X/ith that background, we can
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review the Montana decisions by
looking at the issues with which the
courts have contended. We caî cat-
egoúze the cases under the following
six issues:
1. Whethet the discharge was
ttsudden and unexpectedt' so as to
fït in the exception to the 1973
standard pollution exclusion
a. The Toun Pamp decisions:
ttsuddent' meaning unexpected
Under the standatd pollution
exclusion written directly into the
poJicies in1973, pollution could
only be covered if it was sudden
and accidental. Because the standard
pollution exclusion was in effect as
an endorsement oÍ a direct policy
exclusion from 1970 through 1985,
it is involved in many cases where
pollution damage has only recently
become manifest. The 1981 case of
Town Parnp, Inc. u. Diteman,ls involved
a contractot who improperþ installed
gasoline lines at a Town Pump ser-
vice station in Bozeman so that the
tanks leaked gasoline into neighbors'
water wells. Town Pump þored
evidence that the tanks wete leaking
substantial amounts of gasoline until
the neighbots fìled suit for personal
injury and property damage caused
by pollution of the wells,
General Ins. Co. of America u. Town
Pamp, Inc. (1984),1e was the culmina-
tion of litigation to secure insurance
coverage for those suits. The policy
in the Town Parzrp cases contained the
"standard" pollution exclusion with
the attendant exception for what,the
Supreme Court described as "sudden,
unexpected and unintentional dis-
charges" of gasoline.2o r\n employee
of Town Pump had repeatedly
reported to Town Pump offìcers
her observations of gas pump
"hesitation," gasoline inventory loss,
earth depression around the tanks,
and neighbots' complaints of gas in
their water, all of which indicated
that gasoJine was being lost into the
ground.21 The Disttict Court found
that the spillage occurted over a pe-
riod of two years from Summer
1973 through March of 1975, but
nevertheless, found that the "gasoline
leakage was sudden, unexpected and
unintentional as lar as Town Pump
was concerned."22 On appeal, Gen-
eral Insurance Company conceded
that the pollution exclusion was not
appJicable to the gasoline leakage
in the case, so that the Montana Su-
preme Court said, "we accept that the
pollution was sudden, unexpected and
unintentional and that coverage was
propedy invoked by the insured." 23
\K4rìle there is no holding to such
effect, the Court's acceptance that
the spillage over a pedod of two
years was "sudden, unexpected and
unintentional" puts the decision in a
category with those that did not as-
sþ the word "sudden" a tempoïal
aspect so as to require that the event
be abtupt in order to invoke coverage.
b. The Quisel case raises the
issue: Is ttsuddentt temporal?
In 1990, Judge Battin, in U-Î.-E
ù G. u. Qaisel,2a was conftonted with
the issue of whethet "sudden and
unexpected" had a temporal aspect.
,\ high pressure hose attached to an
underground gasoJine storage tank at
Quiselt gas station in Livingston
ruptured leaking 5,000 gallons of
gasoJine that migrated into surround-
ing properties. The State of Montana
intervened to clean up the spill and
then sued to recover its costs for the
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clean-up program. Quisel tendered
defense of the state action to
U.S.F.&G. which declined coverage
on the basis of the absolute pollution
exclusion. U.S.F.&G. had, by
endorsement, placed the absolute
pollution exclusion in the renewal
poJicy for the frst time without
gtving notice to Quisel. Judge Battin
held that U.S.F,&G. was equitably
estopped from asserting the absolute
pollution exclusion, because the
policy was a renewal and the carrie4
under the cìrcumstances of the case
had mislead the insured into thinking
he was covered on the same renewal
tefms,
Consequently, the court held
that Quisel's policy consisred of the
standard pollution exclusion that
contained an exception for "sudden
and accidental" discharges which
exception had been previously ex-
plained by the agent to the insured.
NØhether the leakage was '.'sudden
and accidental" within that exception
then became the issue, Judge Battin
observed that the courts around the
U.S. were split on the questions of
whether the phrase "sudden and
accidentai" was ambþous and
whether "sudderì" had a temporal
aspect or whether it simply meant
unexpected. Noting the importance
of the issue and the fact that the
Montana Supreme Court had not
decided it, he indicated he would
certify it to that court. However, it
appears the issue was never decicled
there presumably because the case
settled after the decision of the
federal court.
c. The Grindheim case: ..sudden"
being temporal (but still ambigu-
ous)
In the 1995 fedelzrl case of
Crindhein u. Safeco Ins. Co. of America,25
the Deerfield Hutterite Colony near
Lewistown, Montana had for years
allowed human and [vestock sewage
'waste to flow into a coulee that
crossed Grindheim's property and
flowed into the Judith River.
Grindheims alleged the sewage pol-
luted their water and land and cre-
ated offensive odots that seriously
interfered with their enjoyment of
their property and endangered their
health.
The policy grant of coverage
covered the Colony for liability for
any claim or suit "for damages be-
cause of bodily injury or properry
damage caused by an occurrence
to which this coverage applies." An
"occuffence" was defined as "aft
accident, including exposure to
conditions which results, during the
policy period, in bodily injury or
property damage." Before 1990,
the policy contained the "standard
pollution exclusion" excluding:
(8) injury or damage caused by or
resulting from a Pollution Inci-
dent unless injury or damage:
1. Occurs suddenly during the
policy period, and
2. Is unknowingly caused, and
3. Would not have been
expected or intended by a
reasonably prudent person
in [the insured's] position.
Hence, there was no coverage for
pollution unless it was sudden and
unexpected. The policy defined a
Pollution Incident as "the emission,
discharge, release or escape of any
solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal
Contaminant, itritant, or pollutant
into or upon land, the atmosphere, or
^ny watel The policy also contained
a standard exclusion excluding ftom
occurïences "bodily iniury or prop-
erty damage which is expected or
intended by the insured."
In 1990, Safeco altered the poJicy
to absolutely exclude covenge fot a
"Pollution Incident" defined to mean
"the acÍta)' alleged or threatened
discharge, dispersal, seepage, migra-
tion, release or escape of any pollut-
ants." The poJicy further defìned
"Pollutants" as:
any solid, liquid, gaseous or
thermal irritant or contami-
nant, including: smoke, vapor,
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals, fertilizers (whether
of plant or animal origin,
composed of other natural
substances, or chemically
fotmulated) and waste. Waste
includes materials to be
recycles, reconditioned or
reclaimed.
The pollution exclusion was
absolute, because it no longer had an
exception for sudden and unexpected
discharges.
Under the standard pollution
exclusion that governed coverage for
the Colony until 1990, the court had
to determine if the discharges were
"sudden and accidental." The court
noted first that numerous couïts
construing the standard form limited
pollution exclusion "have adopted
the unexpected/unintended vieq
and found that relcases of pollutants
fhat an insured did not expect or
intend are sudden and accidental
within the meaning of the excep-
tfort."26 Secondly, the court noted the
word sudden can mean unexpected
or canhave a temporal connotation
of abrupt or instantaneous, so that it
is ambþous. But, it also recognized
that many other courts assþ the
word sudden a temporal definition
but are not clear on whether the
focus is on the dutation or inception
of the polluting event. The Grindheim
court elected to hold the word sud-
den to have a temporal quality while
finding it ambþous as ro whether
it was the commencement or the
duration of Grindheim's injury that
had to be sudden.27 As will be seen,
the Montana Supreme Court would
also hold the word sudden in the
exception to the 1,973 pollution
exclusion to have a temporal quality.
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d. The Sokoloski case: "sudden"
meaning abrupt
In L999, in Sokoloski u. Americaru
IYest Ins. C0.,28 the Supreme Court
held that smoke and soot damage to
interior ceilings, floots, walls, and
personal property from butning
candles over a period of four to five
weeks was not "sudden and acciden-
tal" so as to fìt in the exception to
the standard pollution exclusion. The
court noted two opposing lines of
authority, one of which has heid such
terms as "sudden and accidental" or
"sudden and unexpected" are subject
to more than one reasonable interpte-
tation and therefôre ambiguous so
as to requite interpretation in favor
of the insured. The other line of
decisions had concluded that such
terms as sudden and accidental are
unambþous and have a temporal
element so that they apply only to
events rhat are abrupt and last a
short time. The coutt, in J'okolos,ki,
concluded that, even if the term
sudden and accidental includes the
concept of unexpectedness, it "also
erìcompasses a tempotal element,
because unexpectedness is already
exptessed by the word accidenta).."2e
The coutt said that sudden "connotes
a sense of immediacy''which might
encompass seconds, minutes or
hours, but simply would not accom-
modate weeks.
e. The Ribi case: "sudden" as
temporal
In the 2005 case of 'frauelers
Casøal4t and Sarefl Comþan1 u. Nbi
Imrtør¿ochern Research, Iruc.,3o RJbir'a
biopharmaceutical manufacturer, had
routineþ disposed of solvents used
in producing its products by dumping
them in the Bitterroot Valley Sanitary
Landfìll in Ravalli County, Montana.
Between 1981 and 1985, the com-
pany pouted the solvents into a
grave-sized earthen pit in the landfìll
with the expectation that they would
evapora;te before reactring ground-
water. Làter investigation revealed
that the solvents were actually reach-
ing the shallow groundwater within
13 to 34 minutes of each disposal.
Ribi was sued in 1,993 by nebh-
bors of the landfìll for personal
infury and property damage by reason
of contamination of the ground-
water. In 1,997, ¡he State of Montana
sued for its response costs incurred
in and atound the landfill and, in
1998, the federal government sued
for the costs of excavation and clean-
ing of contaminated soil perfotmed
by the National Institute of Health.
fubi tendered all three cases to its
CGL carrier, Travelers, which de-
clined coverage with three separate
reservation of rights letters each of
which denied any duty to indemniSr
or defend and warned that Travelers
would seek reimbursement of any
clefense costs expended.
The trial court found that Ribi's
acts constituted an "occutfence"
under the policy but were not "sud-
den and accidental" so as to escape
the poÌicy's standard pollution exclu-
sion that excluded all pollution save
for discharges that were sudden and
accidental. On appeal, the Montana
Supreme Court noted at the outset
that the intent of the CGL policy is to
cover the insured's acts or omissions
including intentional acts so long as
the tesulting injury is not expected
or intended from the standpoint of
the insured. Traveler's policy defined
an "occuffence" as "^n accident
that results in property damage
neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the insured."
The District Court treated the
"neither expected not intended" lan-
guage as an exclusion and placed the
burden of proof on the insurer. The
Supreme Court disagreed holding
that the "neither expected nor in-
tended" langoage v/as part of the
grant of coverage within the insured's
burden of proof. Hence, the insured
must prove that the damages from its
disposal of v¡aste was not "expected
or intended" ftom its standpoint,
Based on the District Cout's
determination that Ribi intentionah
disposed of hazatdous wastes at
BVSL for an extended period of
time, and the dispute as to whether
Ribi intended or expected damage
from its discharge, the Supteme
Couft assumed for purposes of its
decision that there was an "occur-
rence" and tutned its focus to
whether coverage was blocked by the
policy's standard pollution exclusion.
The only exception to the exclusion
was for "sudden and accidental"
discharges. On the issue of whether
Ribi's disposals wete sudden and
accidental, the court followed its
holding in So,kolo¡ki to conclude that
the v¡ord "sudden" was unambiguous
and had a temporal aspect to its
meaning and not merely a sense of
something unexpected. The court
then appJied what it cletermined to
be the majority rule that the insured
bears the burden of proving an
exception to an exclusion, i.e. that its
discharge was sudden and accidental.
The next issue was whether the
"sudden and accidental" exception
applied to Ribi's initial disposal of
the solvents or to the damage caused
by the migration of the wastes. The
court said:
Níe determine that the language
of the CGL policy's pollution
exclusion clearþ excludes cov-
erage for property damage
arising out of the discharge of
hazardous wastes into or upon
the land unless such discharge
, , . is sudden and accidental.
@,mphasis added) The occur-
rence that must be sudden and
accidental then, is the disposal
of hazatdoas wastes into or
upon the land from which the
property damage atose, not the
unexpected migration and
corresponding damages.
Because the coutt had held that
the term "sudden" means abrupt and
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quick, it was cleat that the routine
disposal of solvents over a period of
three years could not be sudden.
Hence, Nbi cotÅd not meet the but-
den of bringing the claims into the
sudden and accidental exception to
the pollution exclusion.
Flence, Grindhein, So/<oloski and
Nbi establtsh that, in Montana, the
word "sudden," ifl the exception to
the standard pollution exclusion, has
a tempotal defìnition so as to mean
abrupt or quick. These decisions
favor the insurers and will make it
very difficult to obtain coverage of
gradaal pollution regardless of
whether the damage is unexpected.
2. Whether the discharge was
excluded by the "expected and
intendedtt exclusion
a. Whether the gasoline leakage
in Town Pump was "expected or
intended"
Since 1966, the property/casuùty
poJicies have covered an "occur-
rence" and defìned occLlrrence to
mean "an accident including in.iurious
exposure to conditions, which results,
during the policy period, in bodily
injury and property clamage that was
neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the insured." Pollu-
rion is not a covered "occuirence" if
it is "expected or intended."
In Gerueral Ins. Co. of America u.
Town Pamþ, Inc.,31 th'e insurer did not
expressly invoke the "expected ot
intended" exclusion but nevertheles,s
sought to avoid coverage on the
ground that Town Pump was actively
negligent after the loss was discov-
ered, so that it could be said to have
participated in the loss. The court
stated General's proposed rule of law
as follows: "If the insuted it g"tlty
of active negligence after the loss is
or should have been discovered, then
it particþates in the loss and total
coverage should not be afforded."
The court rejected the proposirion as
unsupportable saying "Protection
against liabiJity for negligence is the
pdncipal purpose of liability poJicies
like the one we are reviewing here. It
is well established that mere negli-
gence on the part of an insured will
not defeat recovery on a policy. The
insurer assumes the risk of negli-
gence and recovery is permitted even
though the negligence of the insured
contributed to the loss. The court
said that at most the allegation was
of "negligent failure to investigate
and mitigate damages."32 Hence, the
insured's active negligence should not
meet the expected or intended stan-
dard so as to exclude coverage.
b. Portal Pipeline Company and
the '(expected or intended" injury
In Portal Pþe l-;ine Comþan1, u.
Storuewall Ins. Co. (1993),33 the opera-
tor of a crude oil pipeJine between
Montana and Minnesota intentionally
accepted from Enron and others
extremely volatile high vapot pressure
Iiquids for transportation through the
pipeìine. This was in violation of the
contract "tariff" that governed the
handling and operation of the crude
oil pipeline. Äshland Oil Company
which operated a rcfinery in Minne-
sota fìled suit against Portal alleging
that, fot four yeats, as a result of
Portal's conduct, it had sufferecl
losses of income. Portal settled the
litigation and sought indemnity from
four excess insurers.
The policy at issue was an
occurrence policy covering Portal
for all liability for properLy damage
caused by an "occufrence." The
policy defìned "occurtence" as:
[A]n accident or event includ-
ing continuous repeated expo-
sure to conditions, which
results, dudng the policy pe-
riod in PERSONAL INJURY
oT PROPE,RTY DAMAGE
neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the
INSURED.
The District Court granted
summary judgment in favor of the
insurets and dismissal of all claims
on the ground that the damage was
"expected or intended." Pottal
appealed asserting thaq in making
the decision to allov¡ the volatile mix
into the pipeline, it did not expect or
intend the tesulting damage. The
court looked to its 1979 decision
in Northwestern National Cas. Co. u.
Phalen,3a where it said of "expected
or intended": flt precludes coverage
for bodily injuries ot damages,
though not specifìcally intended by
the insured, if the resulting harm was
v¡ithin the expectation or intention of
the insured ftom his standpoint."3s
The court in Porta/ went on to say:
SØe explained that the use of
the word "occufferìce" lnad a
broader definition than the
word "accident" and that the
intent of the policy is to insure
the acts or omissions of the
insuted, including his inten-
tional acts, excluding only
those in which the resulting
injury is either expected or
intended ftom.the insured's
standpoint.3ó
The court determined that Portal
intentionally accepted the high vapor
pressure tiquids in the pipeline know-
ing that rhe tariff prohibited vapor
pressures over 1.3 psi and determined
that "Portal knew, despite its subjec-
tive contentions to the contrary that
its actions were expected to cause
iniury to Ashland's refinery."31
Consequently, it held that Ashland's
claims did not constitute an
"occuffence" so as to be covered.
c. Enron and fraud as expected
or intended injury
lØhile Portal was being denied
insurance for its patt in defrauding
the Astrland Oil Refinery, Enron was
in federal court seeking coverage for
the damages it caused in the same
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scheme, In Enron Oil Trading dz
Transþ. Co. u. Underwriters of Lþtd's of
London (1.996),38 the coutt detailed
Enront fraud in injecting a cheap but
highly volatile crude oil gas mix into
the crude it contracted to provide the
Ashland Oil Refinery. Through mis-
representations and outright fraud,
Enton was able to bilk,\shland out
of mi-llions of dollars whìle causing
substantial damage to the refinery.
Enton was sued and sought CGL
coverage for the extensive damages
claimed. The insurets denied cover-
age on the ground that Enron
expected or intended the damage,
and the court said:
"flhe business decision on
the part of Enron to inject
B-G mix into the pipeline
'was flot, by any stretch of
the imagination, a sudden,
unintended and unexpected
happening. The allegations
of Âshland's complaint
dcscribe a calculated business
scheme whereby Enron reaped
profits in the millions of dol-
lars by concealing the nature
of its actions."3e
Interestingly, 'tn Enron Oil Trading
dzTranE. Co. u. Undenyriters of Llold's
of I-,orudon, the manuscrþt excess
policies involved contained no
exclusion for the insured's intentional
actsao Howcvet, the court examined
Enron's conduct in light of the pubJic
policy against coverage fot an
insured's intentional wtongdoing
or criminal misconduct. The'court
cited the universal recognition of
an impJied exclusion ftom coverage
under any form of insurance for
intentional or expected injury and
denied Enron coverage.
Howevet, the reader should note
that it is not the intentional act that is
excluded but the expected or in-
tended injury or damage.al The Mon-
tana Supreme Coutt has consistently
so held,a2 Nevertheless, acts which by
their vety nature are ceftatn to cause
harm are precluded by public poJicy
from coverage.a3 This is because the
insurance principle protects the in-
suted against injury or loss arising
from contingent events.4 ,{.n insured
cannot be allowed to consciously
conffol risks through intentional acts,
because that would violate the central
principle of insurance.as The court in
F.nron OilTradingfound that Enron
"undertook a series of knowing and
intentional acts desþed to achieve
tremendous economic gasn at
Ashland's expense" and held the
loss.s preclrrded from indemnifica-
tion as a màtter of public policy.a6
3. Whether the r'absolute
pollution exclusion" applies
to the discharge
The plaintiff and the insured
often have a common interest in
securing coverage for the pollutìon
claim. For claims that occurred after
1985, that means finding some way
around absolute pollution exclusion
(f . The Crindbeirzt decision illustrates
one of the possible arguments.
In Crindheint, the pollution corì-
sisted of sewage from pig enclosures
and human sewage from the habita-
tions of the colony. The pollution
exclusion is exceptionally btoad,
covering any solid, Iiquid or gas, so
that argaably its very breadth makes
it ambþous. The Colony contended
that it used pig sev/age as fefijlnzer
on cfops, so that the sewage (and
resulting odors) could not be deemed
pollution. Flence, one potential
escape from the pollution exclusion
is to show that the matedal involved
is not an irritant or contaminant.
For example,'tn Daensing u.
Traue ler's Corzrpanies (1993)f the
Parcot Confectionary store in Helena
was forced to destroy its entire
Christmas inventoty of candy
because one of its employees had
contracted hepatitis. The store
sought coverage for the loss of the
inventor¡ and its insurer, Travelers,
refused in part because of a contami-
nation clause. However, the insurer
was not abl,e to show that the candy
was actually contaminated. The
Montana Supteme Coutt held the
plain, ordinary meaning and under-
standing of contamination requires
the actual presence of a foreþ
substance,
The Enron Oil Trading dz Transþ.
C¿.a8 decision illustrates avoiding the
absolute pollution exclusion by argu-
, ing its overbreadth. Enron had inten-
tionally arranged to mix the crude oil
product it agreed to deliver through
the Portal Pipeline which tan frorn
Eastern Montana to Minnesota with a
highly volatile but cheap contaminant
thereby defrauding the Á.shland Oil
Refinery in Minnesota of millions of
dollars. ìØhen the volatile B-G mix
caused an explosion and $5 million in
damage to the refìnery, Enron was
sued and tendered defense to its
insutets. The insurers refused the
tender on the basis of the absolute
pollution exclusion (f). Enron argued
that the product shipped ri¡as not
pollution because it was not a foreþ
substance and was not discharged
into the environment, The federal
court agteed saying:
"The tetms itritant and con-
tamination, when viewed in
isolation, are virrodly bound-
less, fot there is no substance
or chemical in existence that
would not irritate or damage
some person or prope.rty."ae
>kx*
'lX/ithout some Iimiting prin-
cþle, the pollution exclusion
clause would extend far l>e-
yond its intended scope, and
lead to some absurd tesults.
To take but two simple
examples, reading the clause
broadly would bar coverage
fot bodily injudes suffered by
one who sJips and falls on the
spilled contents of a bottle of
Drano, and for bodily injury
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caused by an alletgSc reaction
to ctrlodne in a Public Pool.
Although Drano and chlorìne
are both irritants or contami-
nants that cause, undet certain
conditions, bodily iniury or
property damage, one would
not ordinarily characterize
these events as pollution."so
The court distingqished pollution
ftom "everyday activities gone
slightly, but not surpdsingly a-wr'/'
sayng "There is nothing unusual
about paint peeling off a wail' asbes-
tos particles escaping during the
installation or temoval of insulation,
or paint drifting off the mark during
a spray painting iob. A teasonable
policy holder, these courts apparently
believed, would not characterize such
routine incidents as pollution."s1 The
court irì Enron held the absolute pol-
lution exclusion ambþous sayìng:
"The exclusion, if read as broadly as
the excess insurers urge, would be
virtually boundless and could con-
ceivably impact the scope of cover-
age far beyond the reasonable
expectations of the inóured. "52
On appeal in Enron Oil Trading
dzTransþ. Co. u. Walbrook Ins. Co.,
L/d.,s3 the Ninth Circuit upheld the
conclusion that the absolute pollution
exclusion was ambiguous in its over-
breadth. The Ninth Circuit did not
reach the lower court's ruling that the
coverage was barred by pubJic policy
by reason of expected or intended
injury. Instead, the court reversed in
part and remanded, because the un-
derþing complaint had plead negli-
gence and strict product liability
which claims the Circuit held would
be covered and the subject of a duty
to defend.
Unfortunately for insurance con-
sumers, the Montana Supreme Court,
tn Sokoloski a. Americaru IYut Ins. Co.
(1,999),s4 rejected a similar argument
that the definition of pollution
is ambþous in its overbreadth
and must be limited to traditional
environmental pollution. Sokoloskis
used scented candles during four or
fìve weeks of the holiday season in
1.994, and the candles caused smoke
and soot to accumulate on the walls,
ceilings, floors, and personal belong-
ings in their home. The insurance
caffier refused the claim on the
ground that such damages were
l>atred by the pollution exclusion.
Recall that, in 1985, the industry
removed the requirement that the
discharge be "into or upon land, the
âtmosphefe or any watefcoufse of
body of watet" to be pollution.
Sokoloskis argued that "pollutant" is
an environmental term of art and
should only apply to "discharges of
pollution into the enviionment from
sources outside the home" citing the
Enron case. Unfortunateþ the court
said the word pollutants was defìned
within the insurance policy to ex-
pressly include smoke and soot dam-
ages. Though that anaþsis begs the
whole point of t}'e Er¿ron decision,
the Sokolo¡,ki court found the defìni-
tion of pollution in the standard
pollution exclusion unambiguous,
The 2001 decision in Montar¿a
Rail Lin,ë u. L,exington Insørar¿ce
Cornpanl,ss involved an absolute
pollution exclusion and hinged on
the meaning of the word "contamina-
tion." A train derailment had dumped
a propane car, asphalt and aload of
canned beet into the Clark Fork Rivet
in ìøestern Montana. The court de-
termined that the CGL poJicy in-
volved expressly covered debris
temoval which it interpreted to apply
to the costs of removing the beer,
asphalt, and the car full of propane
from the river.
The policy contained an absolute
pollution exclusion but also had an
Endorsement No. 1 that contained an
exception for costs of removal of
debris and cleanup. That exception, in
turn, had an exception that provided
"this Policy does not insure against
the costs of decontamination. . ."
Hence, the issue apparently became
whethet such damages were pre-
cluded as "contamination" under the
absolute pollution exclusion or the
exclusion in Endorsement No. 1.
To resolve the issue, the court
simply noted that the policy covered
the asphalt and beer as debris on the
railroad right of way, and it didn't
make it contamination just because it
landed in the river. Without expressly
saFng so, the case would seem to be
authority for the propositìon that
whether a substance or product is
pollution depends on its context,
whether (to paraphrase Pþeftters,
supra) it is "everyday activities . . .
gone awry," or traditional environ-
mental pollution. As the court said'
in Enron Oil Trading "...contamina-
tion is an environmental term of art
such that pollution exclusion clauses
utilzing that particular term apply
only to discharges of pollutants into
the environment."5ó S o/<olos/<i and
Enron are not consistent, but Enron is
well reasoned and should protect
claimants and insurance consumers
from misuse of the exclusion by
insurers.
Whether pig sewage was "pollu-
tion" was not âctually the determin-
ing issue in Grindheim, The court
there was swayed by the fact that
Grindheims had also sued in trespass
and nuisance which constituted inva-
sions of privacy interests and fell
under the "petsonal injury'' (as op-
posed to bodily injury) portions of
the Fatm Liability policy. The court
determined that injury that fell under
"personal injutt/'was not subject to'
the pollution exclusion. Conse-
quently, the court concluded and held
that Safeco had a duty to defend at
least those portions of the claims that
sounded in trespass and nuisance and
alleged conduct before the Colony
had notice of the damage itwas do-
ing to Grindheimt property. Conse-
quently, Crindhein illustrates another
technique for securing coverage
of pollution elren irì the fact of the
absolute pollution exclusion. If one
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pleads the claim as aform of "per-
sonal injury''under the CGL policy
defìnitions, then the exclusion does
not apply.
4. Whether the insurer had a duty
to defend the pollution claim
a. Duty to defend in the
Grindbeim case
In the Crindbein case; plaintiffs
alleged the human and animal sewage
from the Deerfield Colony polluted
their water and land and created of-
fensive edors that seriously interfered
with their enjoyment of their prop-
erry and endangered their health.sT
NØhen they sued, Safeco refused to
defend or indemni$r citing the
poJicy's pollution exclusion. The
Colony confessed judgment for
$500,000 on a covenant not to sue
and assþed its rights agnnst Safeco
to the Grindheims. Grindheims then
sued Safeco in a case that, on appeaT,
would raise several seminal pollution
coverage issues in Montana among
them the duty to defend.
Ordinariþ the insurer initially
determines v¡hether the duty to de-
fend has been triggered by reviewing
the allegations set forth in the com-
plaint.ss The duty to defend arises
if the complaint against an insured
alleges facts, which if proven, would
result in coverage.se If the insurer,
v¡ithout justification, refuses to
defend, it will later be estopped from
denying coverage to the insured.60
On the other hand, if the allegations
of the complaint show that no
coverage exists under the polic¡
the insurer has no duty to defend
and does not have a duty to make 
.
any further investigation.
Safeco denied coverage asserting
there was no occurrence because all
the property damage claimed was
expected or intended by the Deerfield
Colony. On appeal, however, the
Supreme Cout disagreed, citing
Portal Pþe Une Co. u. Stonewall Ins. Co.,
for the proposition that "the intent of
the policy is to insure the acts or
omissions of the insured, including
[its] intentional acts, excluding only
those in which the resulting injury is
either expected or intended from the
insuted's standpoint."6l Accordingly,
the court concluded that the expected
and intended exclusion applies to the
damage and not the discharge. Con-
sequently, the exclusion would only
apply to damage caused after the
Colony had notice of the damage
their pollution was causing neiehbors.
That conclusion prompted the court
to add that "The duty to defend with
respect to a particular complaint is
tdggered regardless of the fact that
only a portion of the complaint
alleges facts, which if proven would
result it eovetage."62
b. The duty to defend in Ribi
In the Nbi case, Travelers de-
fended under reservation of rights
warning thatithad no coverage and
intended to seek reimbursement of
its costs of defense if it prevailed in
its declaratory action. The District
Court determined that Travelers had
no duty to defend, and the Supreme
Court was faced v¡ith the conflict
between its claimed adherence to the
"fouf corners" fule and its abhor-
rence of requiring insurers to defend
cases involving intentional conduct
that has been pleaded as negligence.
The court has long subscribed to
the princþle thatif,u¡ithin its four
corners, the complaint states a clatm
that, if proven, would invoke cover-
age, the insurer owes its insured a
defense.63 Correspondingly, if the
complaint alleges only events not
within the coverage of the policy so
that there would be no indemnifica-
tion, then the insurer has no duty to
defend.6a The Supreme Court has
also asserted that, when comparing
the allegations of the complaint with
the opetative language of the policy,
a court must liberally construe the
allegations in the complaint to resolve
all doubts about their meaning in
favor of finding and obligation to
defend.6s If the complaint alleges
facts that would not be coveted along
with facts that would be covered, rhe
carriet must defend.66 If the insurer
chooses to look at facts outside the
complaint, it does so at its own risk.67
Nevertheless, when faced v¡ith a
clearþ intentional act that was plead
in the four corners of the complaint
as negligence, the court, tn New
Hamþsbire Irus. Group u. Strecker
(1990),68 compromised the four
corners rule by saylng that the acts
Srri"g rise to the claim form the basis
for coverage, not any legal theories
contained in the undedying com-
plaint. So too, in Børns u. Undenyriters
AQ'usting Co. (1,988),6e the court said,
over Justice Sheeþ's sffong dissent,
"the proper focus of inquiry is the
acts giving rise to coverage, not the
language of the complaint." We
should note that the Strecker and
Børn¡ cases involved heinous claims
of physical assault and child sexual
molestation respectiveþ for which the
court would be loathe to grant the
wrongdoers the benefit of a defense
at the expense of the insurers.
In deciding the duty to defend
issue in Nbi, the Supreme Court
announced that "Ì')Øe apply the four-
corners rule as the policy's language
determines an insurer's duty to de-
fend its insured."7o However, citing
Streckerin the next sentence, the court
said "The acts giving rise to the claim
form the basis for coverage, not any
legal theories contained in the under-
þing complaint."7l The court asserted
that circumstances in Nbi differed
from those in St@les where the court
had said the insurer may not look to
facts outside the complaint, Here, the
court reasoned that the facts were not
in dispute and that Ribi's intentional
disposal cannot be considered "acci-
dental" and therefore "sudden" in
order to invoke the exception to
the pollution exclusion. Nbi bites
pollution plaintiffs and insureds who
might benefit by pleading negligence
il
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in those situations where the insured
intentionally disposed but never
dreamed that damage was being
caused. The case comPromises the
four-cotners rule in pollution cases
and favors the insurer over local
paties who didn't teahze rhey
were polluting groundw^ten or
other property.
5. Whether the insurer that
defends can recoup defense
costs from the insured
The court in Nþi also dealt
insureds a bad hand in its decision
rhatTravelers could recoup its de-
fense costs for claims that were ulti-
mately determined to be barred by
the pollution exclusion. In order for
an insurer to recoup defense costs it
must: "(1) specifically reserve the
right to seek reimbursement from the
insured; and Q) provide the insured
with adequate notice of this potential
reimbursemeflt."T2 The court found
that Travelers had met both require-
ments in the teservation of rights
letters it sent Wbi.
The holding applies to but is not
necessarily limited to CGL policies
and the pollution exclusion. While it
may have dire tepercussions fot
insureds in other situations, its impact
is signifìcant in the area of toxic torts
where insurers have discovered that
their defense obligations often cost
mote than the loss paid. It likely will
prompt mote negotiation of defense
costs between insuteds and theit
insurers. Insurets who deny coverage
fot indemnity but are cogntzant that
the duty to defend is broader than the
duty to indemnifii now have a much
more secure position from which to
bargatn over defense costs. The com-
mercial polluters are Jikely to be sol-
vent entities from whom recovery of
defense costs may be viable. Hence,
insureds wìll have more risk now that
the court has, for the frst time, rec-
ognized the insurer's ability to recoup
defense costs if it ultimateþ prevails
on the coverage issue,
6. Whether remedial measures
are "property damage" under the
policies
In the Montana Federal District
Court decision in pøisel,13 the
insurer raised the issue whether
pollution clean-up costs qualify as
"Property Damage" under the grant
of coverage of the CGL policy.
The policy there defined "Property
Damage" to mean:
1) physical injuty to or destruction
of tangible property which occurs
during the policy period, including
the loss of use thereof at any írr,e
resulting therefrom, or
2) loss of use of tangible property
which has not been physically
injured or destoyed provided such
loss of use is caused by an occur-
rence during the poJicy pedod.
The court noted that courts de-
ciding this issue have been "sharply
divided," some construing environ-
mental clean-up costs to be property
damage, and others saFng they ate
not. The court reflected that at-
tempts by the goYernment to recoup
do not seek contribution or indem-
nity for "loss of use of property or
for physical damage to propetty."
However, they do seek damages
"directly attributable to the undedy-
ing pollution event, and the damages
caused therefrom, to the insured's
property and to the property of
others."
Because of the split of authority
and the fact rhat the federal court
deemed this a matter of state law,
Judge Battin elected to certify the
question to the Montana Supteme
Court. As was mentioned eadier, the
case was never decided there presum-
ably because it settled.
Grindheida also raised the issue
of whether clean-up costs and costs
for taking remedial measures to pro-
tect adjoining landowners are covered
as property damage under the liabiìity
provisions of the CGL policy. The
courg however, defetred any decision
on that issue on the ground that it
was not rþe for determination,
such remediation apparently being
ptospective at that time.
Hence, at this time, the Montana
courts have not decided whether
clean-up costs are "property dam-
age." For a good discussion of the
issue and a holding that they are
covered as property damages, see the
Iowa Supteme Court's 1991 decision
1n A.Y. McDonald Indastries, Inc. u.
Insørance Co. of Nortb America.Ts
D. Conclusion
The significant increase in the
amount of environmental pollution
litigation in Montana will produce
a corolTary increase in the number
of pollution insurance issues that
Montana state and federal courts will
have to address. The challenge under
policies before the absolute pollution
exclusion will be to secure coverage
for insureds who knowingly dit-
charged pollution but did not know
the damage that would ultimately be
caused. The challenge under the
policies with the absolute pollution
exclusion is to keep the insurance
industry ftom misusing the exclusion
to simply deny liability in any case
whose instrument of damage was
any soJid, liquid or gas.
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ANNUAL MEMBERSHIPS
Regular Membetship
Annual membership dues depend on years in ptac-
tice ($70 to $245 a yeat). Whatever the level, when
you make your annual payment, you are encouraged
to give an additional $25, $50, $100, or more for the
CPF.
Sustaining Membetship
'\nnual membetship dues are $750.
l,ike regular members, you âre encouraged to
give an additional amount for the CPF.
aoaaaaaooooaoaoaooooaaaoaaooooaoaaaaaaoaoaaoaoaaaaaaaaoaaaoaoaoaa
Consumer Protection Fund (CPF). The CPF supports MTLlfs lobbying efforts, purchases bike helmets, supports
public education, and coalition builcling 
- 
all important in our work.
Montana LawPAC, the political group that supports various candidates that promote the civil justice system; and
AAJ PAC, the national group thât supports various candid¿tes and causes to promote the civil iustice system.
PAC CARD MEMBERSHIPS
MTI-A Suppotter ($45lmonth) MTI_A Advocate (g100/montþ
a) $25 MTLA annual dues a) g6I.25 MTI-A annual dues
b) $10 Montana LawPr\C b) $1g.75 Montânâ LawpAC
c) $ 5 MTI-A CPF c) $ 5 MTLA CpF
d) $ 5,\AJ PÀC d) $1s A¿,J PAC
MTLA Sustaining Membet ($75lmo) MTI_A Stalwart ($125lmonth)
a) $40 MTI-A annual dues a) g75 MTLA annual dues
b) $20 Montana LawP,\C b) g25 Montana LawpAC
c) $ 5 MTI-A CPF c) $ 5 MTLA CpF
d) $10 AAJ Ð\C d) $20 AÂJ PAC
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